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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
KEITH 'VINEGAR, doing business 
a::; Internwuntain Oil Distributors, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SLIM OLSON, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 7780 
Brief of Defendant and Respondant 
STATEMENT 
Appellant alleges, on page 3 and 4 of his brief, that 
this action was to recover damages for the total loss of 
a Diesel engine '·which loss was caused by reason of the 
negligent installation of an oil filter bag by the defend-
ant's employees.'' 
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'ro state the situation accurately, it was an action 
to recover damages allegedly caused by reason of an al-
h~ged negligent installation of an oil filter bag by this 
defendant's employees. 
li1acts pertinent, in addition to those stated by plain-
tiff and appellant in his brief, are: 
Defendant denies any negligence and in turn alleged 
in its answer that "if plaintiff's property, referred to in 
said complaint, was damaged and plaintiff suffered any 
loss thereby, said danmge and loss resulted from and was 
proximately caused by plaintiff's own negligence or some 
other intervening cause not the fault of defendant". 
rrhe case was tried to the court sitting without a 
jury. After plaintiff had completed the presentation of 
his evidence and had rested, upon motion of defendant, 
the court granted a non-suit. Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and Judgment of non-suit were thereafter 
duly made and entered by the court. Rule 41 (b) and Rule 
52 (a), Ut. Rules of civil procedure. Plaintiff's evidence 
showed that the Diesel engine in question, an old 1932 or 
1933 Model converted, was delivered to defendant's place 
of business at Bountiful by plaintiff's agent, on the 24th 
day of January, 1951, and that defendant furnished a 
sump bag for which a charge was made as shown on 
plaintiff's exhibit "A". 
After it was serviced the vehicle was taken from 
defendant's place of business, the same day, by plain-
tiff's agent, and used to haul heavy loads of oil ranging 
from 4500 to 5700 gallons per load. It functioned normal-
ly until it had travelled 2190 miles. It should have been 
serviced, as recommended, from 1500 to 2500 miles. It 
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pulled loads up and down long hea.Yy grades part of the 
time at speeds up to ;)U 1nile~ per hour. lt was in regular 
:sen·iee pulling these heavy loads January :2~), :2u, :2~, 30, 
;-u, and February 1, 1951. rrhe engine functioned perfed-
ly nornml during that tiine. 'l'he oil placed in the engine 
was furnished by the plaintiff and out of his own con-
tainers purchased fr01n Phillips 66 Oil C01npany. 
Plaintifrs agent, a ~lr. \Voolslayer, \Vho drove the 
unit in question and deliYered it to defendant for serv-
icing, on the 24th day of January, ren1ained with it and 
\Vatched defendant's en1ployees service it, he testified 
it was his duty to re1nain with and watch it serviced. On 
the night of February 1, 1951, the unit was driven from 
plaintiff's place of business in Bountiful to the Standard 
Oil Refinery in North Salt Lake City to load. As it ap-
proached the refinery, the driver heard a knocking noise . 
..:\.fter it was loaded it was driven, with this load of 4625 
gallons of oil, a mile south, then up highway 91 about a 
mile and a half, with internrittant knocking noises, then 
the oil pressure went down. A mechanic was called by 
plaintiff's agent who came down to where the driver had 
stopped it or parked off the highway. He started up 
the motor and said it run Rinoothly or normally for two 
or three minutes then he put it in gear and started up 
the highway pulling the load. Shortly thereafter a severe 
knocking occurred, the temperature rose suddenly; the 
mechanic heard son1ething like a bearing going out and 
the oil pressure left. The driver hadn't told the 1nechanic 
what was wrong. 
Plaintff claims that the damage resulted from a 
plugged oil line from the sump to the engine. One of his 
witnesses testified that he knew of no way the dmnage 
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could have resulted except through a faulty installation 
of the sump bag or filter. The court refused to permit 
cross examination of this witness as to other possible 
ways it could have resulted except upon penalty of being 
bound by his answers. Other testilnony on cross exam-
ination showed there were other possible ways of causing 
the damage than that suggested. The oil line between 
the sump and the engine was not produced nor was there 
any evidence of any examination of the oil line as to 
whether it was clogged. The evidence indicated that a 
part of the filter bag was wrinkled as if it had been 
pulled into an opening when the motor was pulled down. 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT No. I 
The court did not err in granting a nonsuit in this 
case. 
POINT No. II 
The court did not err in its Findings of Fact No. 
V wherein the court found that the evidence of the plain-
tiff was insufficient to show that defendant failed to use 
due and proper care and skill. 
POINT No. III 
The court did not err in entering a judgment of 
nonsuit for the reason that said judgment is supported 
by the Findings and Conclusions, and the Findings and 
Conclusions are supported by the evidence and the law. 
POINT No. IV 
The court did not err in its Finding of Fact No. IY 
in defining the duty of defendant as one to use due care 
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and skill. 
POINT No. Y 
The court did not err in its Finding of Fact No. V 
that defendant failed to use due or proper care and skill 
and failed to ~how that defendant wa~ guilty of any 
negligent acts. 
POINT No. YI 
The court did not err in its conclusion of law that 
defendant i~ entitled to judg1nent of nonsuit. 
ARur~lEXT ON THE LA\V OF NONSUITS 
Points ll and Yl inclusive relied upon by appellant 
are and each of then1 is an integral part of his point 
I and they will not be argued separately. 
1. First, it should be pointed out that appellant 
bases his case on appeal, on Title 104-29-1 ( 5), which 
was repealed by Sec. 104-43-8 Laws of Utah 1951, and 
superseded by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
more specifically Rule 41 (b), which said rules were 
adopted by the Supreme Court of Utah effective Janu-
ary 1, 1950. Further, it will be noted that even under 
the old code of Civil Procedure the plaintiff could not 
prevail, as plaintiff's citation, relied upon in his brief, 
are not in point and are not accurate or full citations, 
and are taken from jury cases. 
It is fundamental law that there is a basic distinc-
tion between jury and non-jury cases. In jury cases, 
the court is trier of the law, and the jury is trier of the 
facts. In the non-jury case, the court is trier of both the 
law and the facts. The instant case was a non-jury trial 
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~o that appellant's citations to support his appeal are 
dearly distinguishable and do not apply to those case 
even aside from Hule 41 (b) Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 
~,he case cited in appellant's brief in paragraphs 
1 ,2, and 3 of his argu1nent pages 7 and 8, Robinson vs. 
Salt Lake City, 37 Utah 520, 109 Pac 817 and decided in 
1910 was a jury case. In Graham vs. Ogden Union Rail-
way and Depot Company, 79 Utah 1, 6 pac. (2d) 462, de-
sided in 1931 and cited by appellant in his argmnent 
paragraph 4, page 8 and page 28, it will be noted that 
the case was one before a jury and clearly distinguish-
bale. The case also involved a directed verdict for de-
fendant, and not a non suit, a further distinction, along 
with the fact that plaintiff asked to reopen the case to 
put on more evidence to cure the alleged defect in 
his evidence, which request the trial court refused to 
allow. The issue of the sufficiency of the motion for a 
directed verdict was not raised on appeal, nor was the 
question of nonsuit raised, so that any ruling on such 
is dicta and not binding on this court. 
In Valiates vs. Utah Apex :Mining Company, 55 Utah 
151, 184 Pac. 802, decided in 1919 and cited in appellant's 
brief in paragraph 5 of his argument on page 9, it will 
be seen that this too was a jury case. It also concerned 
a motion for nonsuit made by defendant which was over-
ruled, again not in point. The court in this case stated 
'' * * * * the trial eourt must give to plaintiff the benefit 
of every fair and reasonable inference that might proper-
ly be drawn from the evidence by the jury * * * *". 
(Italics ours) the Italicized words were left out of Ap-
pellant's brief on page 9. 
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~umlley Y::i. H.io Grange \\' e::;tern Hail way C01npany, 
;)4 l·tah 4~3, 98 Pac. 31, decided in 1908, and cited by ap-
pellant on page 29 was also a jury case and not in point. 
Barlow Y::;. Salt Lake and U. R. C01npany, [)7 Utah 
31:2, 194 P. lili5, decided in 19~0 and cited by appellant 
on page 31 of his brief was a case tried before a jury 
and further distinguished by the fact that appeal was 
taken fr01n a refusal of the court to grant a nonsuit for 
defendant, along with sixty-four other assign1nents of 
error. It Inust be noted, that all of the citations from 
An1. Juris. by appellant on pages 24, 25, and 26 of his 
brief were based on cases and texts written before the 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is 
further noted that with the exception of appellants first 
citation on page 24 of his brief, the stateinents taken 
from the text concerned jury trials, with supporting cita-
tions taken from jury trials where the jury alone is trier 
of the facts. 
This appeal must be determined under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure as adopted by the Utah Supreme 
Court, effective January 1, 1950, more specifically Rules 
1 (a) Scope of Rules and 41 (b) 
* * * * ''After the plaintiff has completed the presen-
tation of his evidence the defendant, without waiving 
his right to offer evidence in the event the motion 
is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the 
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff 
has shown no right to relief. In an action tried by 
the court withmtt a jury the co1trt as trier of the facts 
may then determine them and render judgment 
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any 
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the 
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court renders judgment upon the merits against the 
plaintiff, the court shall n1ake findings as provided in 
Rule 52 (a). Unless the court in its order for dis-
missal otherwise specifies, a disn1issal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in 
this rule other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdic-
tion or for improper venue, operates as an adjuca-
tion upon the merits." (Italics ours). 
This Rule, just cited, is verbatum with Rule 41 (b) 
of the Federal Rules from which our rules were taken with 
the exception that the. Federal Rules do not contain the 
last sentence found in the Utah Rules. 
Rule 1 A of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is essen-
tially the same as Rule one of the Federal Rules and the 
last sentence is verbatum with the last sentence of Fed-
eral Rule 1, except our Rule adds the word "liberally". 
Our Rule so far as pertinent here reads as follows: 
'' * * * * They shall be liberally construed to secure 
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action.'' 
It is elemental law that when one jurisdiction adopts 
a statute or law of another, the interpretation of the lend-
ing jurisdiction as it exists at the time of the borrowing, 
will usually be adoped or at least be given very great 
weight by the borrowing state. So it is with the Rule 
and Interpretation of the rule which was borrowed by 
this Court from the Federal Rules. 
The latest case found interpreting Rule 41 (b) of 
the Federal Rules is the United States vs. United States 
Gypsu1n Co. 10 F. R. Serv. 41 (b) 14 Case 1, 67 Fed. Supp. 
397, decided in 1946 by the District Court of the District of 
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Colo1ubia. In thi::; case, defendant uwved for a nonsuit 
and disn1issal at the end of plaintiff's case, on the 
ground that upon the facts and the law, the plaintiffs 
had shown no right to relief. (Italics ours). The 
trial court granted the nwtion and plaintiff appealed. 
In upholding the trial courts ruling the appellate court 
stated: 
.. A judge in a jury trial does not withdraw a case 
frmn the jury on defendant's 1notion at the end of 
plaintiff's case unless the judge can fairly say that 
no reasonable jury 1nan could find for plaintiff * * * 
But in an action tried without a jrury, the judge is 
trier of both the facts and the law. r_}~his fundamen-
tal distinction between jury and nonjury trials 
should not be ignored. * * * * Rule 1 expressly pro-
vides that the rules shall be construed to secure the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action." * * * * (Italics ours). 
(Utah Rules of Civil Procedure No. 1, as noted above, 
includes the same provision). 
''Therefore a court should dispose of a case at first 
opportunity which is appropriate with the rules and 
in accord with the rights of the parties. When a 
court sitting without a jury, has heard all of the 
plaintiff's evidence, it is appropriate that the court 
shall then determine whether or not the plaintiff has 
convincingly shown a right to relief. (Italics ours). 
It is not reasonable to require a judge, on a motion 
to dismiss under Rule 41 (b) to determine merely 
whether there is a prima facie case, such as in a 
jury trial should go to a jury, where there is 
no jury - to determine merely whether there is a 
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priina facie case sufficient for the consideration of 
a trier of facts, when he is hiinself the trier of facts. 
rro apply the jury trial practice in non-jury proceed-
ings would be to erect a requirement compelling a 
defendant to put on his case, and the court to spend 
the ti1ne and incur the public expense of hearing it if 
the plaintiff had, according to jury trial concepts, 
umde a 'case for the jury' even though the judge had 
concluded that on the whole of the plaintiff's evidence 
the plaintiff ought not to prevail. A plaintiff who 
has had full opportunity to put on his own case and 
has failed to convince the judge, as a trier of the 
facts, of a right to relief, has no legal right under 
the due process clause of the constitution, to hear 
the defendant's case, or compel the court to hear it, 
1nerely because the plaintiff's case is a prima facie 
one in the jury_ trial sense of the term. * * * * We 
conclude that Rule 41 (b) it is the duty (Italics 
ours) of the court to weigh the evidence, to draw 
the inference therefrom, and, if it finds the evi-
dence insufficient to make out a case for the plain-
tiff, to render a decision for the defendant on the 
merits.'' 
No. 29 of the Syllabus reads : 
''In Federal Courts, substantial evidence rather than 
a mere scintilla is necessary to support judgment." 
On page 451 of this decision the court further 
said: 
'' * * * * By substantial evidence is meant more than 
a mere scintilla; it must do more than create a sus-
picion of the existance of the fact to be established.'' 
This case seems to be directly in point with the in-
10 
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~taut l'a:::;e and lay:::; down the law for judgn1ents of non-
::mit under the new Rules of Procedure. 
In Barr Y. Equitable Life Assurance ~oeiety of the 
rnited ::;tate~, S F. R. Serv. -11 (b) .32 Case 1, 149 ~-,. 
(:Zd) 634 appealed to the CCA 9th frmn the District Court 
of the X orthern District of California, Southern Division 
and decided in 1945, it was held: 
'· \Ve agree that there is evidence warranting the 
inference of fact supporting the judg1nent. \Ve 
assu1ne there it' testiinony fron1 which a contrary 
inference nmy be drawn * * * * after the plaintiff 
has cmnpleted the presentation of his evidence the 
defendant, without waiving his right to offer evi-
dence in the event the motion is not granted, may 
n1oYe for a distnissal on the ground that 'upon the 
facts and the law the plaintiff has shown not right 
to relief." (Italics ours) . 
In Bach v. Friden Calculatign Machine Co., Inc., 8 
F. R. Serv. 41 (b) .14 case 2; 148 F. (2d) 407 CCA 6th 
1945, the case was appealed from the District Court of 
the United States, Southern District of Ohio, \Vestern 
Division. Upon an appeal from the lower court granting 
the defendant's motion to dismiss that under the facts 
and the law, plaintiff had shown no right to relief, plain-
tiff appealed. The appellate court upheld the lower 
courts ruling and stated as follows : 
''Findings of Fact shall not be set aside unless clear-
ly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credi-
bilit:Y of the witnesses. * * * * It is clear that it was 
intended (the adoption of the Rules) to give the 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
trial court the power to weigh the evidence and draw 
inferences therefrom at the conclusion of plaintiff's 
proof, both in law and in equity. 
When it is remeinbered that the purpose of the Rules 
Practice is to expedite the trial of cases, it would 
seem that the trial court should be able to dispose 
of cases at the earliest opportunity and to this end 
that it should have the power to weigh the evidence 
and consider the law at the end of plaintiff's case 
in jury-waived actions * * * * A plaintiff is deprived 
of no right by such procedure and a defendant is 
released of the burden of going forward, and no 
Constitutional rights of either party is invaded. 
* * * * In Young vs. U. S., 111 F. (2d) 823, 825 it 
was held that the court would not disturb the find-
ings of fact of the trial court unless they were clear-
ly erroneous. * * * * 
The sensible course to be followed in the trial of 
cases by the court without a jury is that if, at the 
close of the plaintiff's proof, his case has not been 
made out by a preponderance of the evidence, 
(Italics ours) the action should be dismissed, 
which makes the question, one of fact." 
These three most recent Federal cases interpreting 
Rule 41 (b) which is the same as our Rule 41 (b) and 
as applied under Rule 1 (a) are exactly in point with the 
case at bar, and are conclusive. 
The testimony of Clarence R. Miller who was called 
as an expert witness for appellant is both ambiguous and 
contradictory. At page 14 of the transcript, also cited 
by appellant, Mr. Miller testified on direct examination 
concerning the filter unit taken from the cylinder in crank 
12 
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ea::;e, which ::;aid filter wa~ umrked plaintiff'::; Exhibit D . 
. He fir::;t testified: 
.. Q. ..:-\.nd did you see the Exhibit D ~~xtnwted fron1 
the cylinder 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. * * * * I call your attention to the bag to a point 
about a foot up on the bag where the bag seen1s to be torn. 
X ow, will you tell us where that piece of cloth or that part 
of the bag was located as far as this pan is concerned at 
the tune you first observed it! 
A. "\V ell, we had to pull it out. This part here was 
out in the discharge hole. 
Q. When you say ··this part here'' point to the area. 
A. You can see the rings. 
Q. Around the holes and wrinkles around the hole. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was inside the discharge hole. Is that 
correct~ 
A. Yes.'' 
The witness, Miller, then changed his testimony and 
admitted his prior statements were incorrect when on 
pages 18 and 19 he testified that it was ilnpossible to see 
where the bag was. This testimony, still on direct exanl-
ination, now is as follows: 
'' Q. You know what had caused the creasing or 
whPre that part of the bag had been? 
A. Only one place it could have been, is up that 
13 
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hole, but ymt can't see behind there to see whether it was. 
You have to pull it out if you have a restriction." (Italics 
ours). 
Mr. ~filler's testimony is further weakened and nmde 
more ambiguous by his answer on direct exa1uination as 
to how the bag allegedly got off the spool and into the 
discharge hole. His testilnony on pages 19 and 20 is this : 
'• Q. Now then, do you have an opinion as to what 
caused the bag to get in the discharge hole and off the 
spool¥ 
A. * * * *Yes. 
Q. All right, what is your opinion~ 
A. The bag had to get behind the end blade of this 
spool here in order to get in the discharge hole. 
THE COURT: All right: 
A. And I don't know of any other way it could have 
got there unless it was out there to start with when the 
bag was installed." (Italics ours). 
Mr. l\1:iller did not state anywhere in his testimony 
that he saw the discharge hole blocked, or saw the bag 
improperly wrapped. In effect it was his opinion that 
he knew of no other way it could have happened. He then 
contradicted himself again and changed his testimony by 
stating that it was possible for the bag to slip. This is 
shown by his testimony on pages 21 and 22 of the tran-
script. 
"Q. Now, you say that, in your opinion, that (the 
edge of the bag) got over the end of that plate in the 
14 
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beginning, you mean at the ti1ne of installation. 
A. That is what I believe. 
Q. ~ow, will you show us by denwnstrating with 
the bag in which 1nanner that occurred, in your opinion 7 
• * •• 
A. It '.s pos.sible that it could have slipped in that 
position, I'm not saying that it did."' (Italics ours) 
By this last answer the witness contradicts all of 
his other testilnony and states that the bag could have 
~lipped so that the bag could have gotten, into the dis-. 
charge hole, which in his opinion, is what caused the 
damage to the engine. 
Plaintiff and appellant's second witness, Leslie Holt, 
also failed to show that he saw the discharge hole plugged, 
or the sack in the hole, or the bag improperly wrapped 
by defendant's mechanic. At page 44 he stated: 
'' Q. * * * * Did you see the bag in the discharge 
hole? 
A. Didn't see the bag in there. I seen the pieces 
of it in there. 
Q. You did. The pieces only! 
A. That's right." 
On cross examination Mr. Holt went on to admit 
that the cmn shaft regulator could be defective or plugged 
with foreign material and build up excessively high pres-
sure. On page 54 of the transcript, he testified as fol-
lows: 
'' Q. In other words, if your regulator is defective, 
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likely it would build up more than 60 pounds'? 
A. 1 t would build up excessive pressure. 
Q. And it 1nay build up an excessively high pres-
sure if your valve is defective. 
A. If it was plugged it would increase your pres-
sure. 
Q. Or some foreign material becmne fast in your 
oil line. That could also. 
A. That would build up pressure in your filter, yes. 
Q. And undoubtedly would, would it not? 
A. It would build up excess pressure. It would 
render your by pass valve useless.'' 
"Q. And it would build up sufficient pressure to 
explode that oil bag. That is, it may.'' 
The court ( we think erroneously) sustained an ob-
jection to that question as incompetent, irrelevant and 
immaterial. T. Pg. 54. The witness further testified 
that the longer the bag was used without a change of oil 
the more pores in the bag would become clogged with 
sludge and carbon particles, he did not see the bag or 
spool, Exhibit D, installed, but said the spool was proper-
ly installed and fastened as far as he could see external-
ly when he saw the engine after the damage was done. 
T. Pg. 56 and 57. 
The third expert witness, called by plaintiff and ap-
pellant, was William R. lVIcLelland who did not see the 
engine in question, and who was not there when it was 
torn down. He did not see a blocked oil line nor the posi-
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tion of the bag when it wa~ reu10ved. His te~tiuwny on 
the da1nage to the engine and what caused such dautage 
was incmnpetent and should be ignored. Appellant's 
state1nent in his argmnent on page ~4 that this witne~s 
stated the bag had been sucked into the discharge line 
and blocked said line cmnpletely is absolutely incorrect 
and should be disregarded. 
The witness did say, however, in answer to the ques-· 
tion • ·how long it would take a bearing being starved of 
oil, pulling loads uphill, to burn out or be destroyed. 
A. \Vell, if the oil is blocked off it's just a u1atter 
of seconds, I would say." 
It is obvious from close examination and correct 
interpretation of the transcript of testimony that there 
is absolutely no direct evidence that defendant and 
respondents mechanic improperly or negligently 
wrapped the filter bag in question. There is absolutely 
no direct evidence that the oil line was plugged or that 
the filter bag plugged it. To the contrary, :Mr. Miller, 
on cross-examination, stated that the filter bag' could 
have slipped into the position that plaintiff and appel-
lant allege defendant's mechanic had wrapped it. 
This Court, in Putnam v. Industrial Commission 80 
Utah 187, 14 P (2d) at page 981 decided in 1932, held 
that the testimony of a witness is no stronger than his 
testimony on cross-examination in the following words: 
''The familiar rule is applicable that the testimony 
of a witness on his direct examination is no stronger 
than as modified or left by his further examination 
or by his cross-examination." 
17 
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ln the absence of direct testiuwny as to any neg-
ligence of defendant's employee, the absence of direct 
testimony that the oil line was plugged or that the filter 
bag was in said hole, coupled with the witness Holt's 
admission, on cross-exmnination, that the bag could have 
slipped, and the mileage the truck had traveled and the 
use to which it had been put, the trial court correctly 
g-ranted a nonsuit against plaintiff on the merits. The 
trial court heard all of plaintiff's evidence, weighed it, 
and decided that, under the facts and law, plaintiff ought 
not to prevail. The trial court as trier of the law and 
the facts ought not be forced to hear defendant's case 
when he has not been convinced that plaintiff should 
prevail. 
Appellant's citations, upon which he based his ap-
peal, have no bearing on this case. First, said citations 
were all taken from jury cases as distinguished from this 
instant case which was a non-jury trial. Secondly, each 
of his cases was based on the law under the repealed 
code-section, having been replaced by our Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure which were copied from the Federal 
Rules. 
Appellant's contention that the motion made for a 
non-suit was not sufficient in detail is without merit. Rule 
4:1 (b) as cited above, states that the defendant 
'' * * * * may move for a dismissal on the ground 
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has 
shown no right to relief.'' 
In the instant case, defendant moved for a nonsuit and 
dismissal 
"upon the grounds and for the reason that there has 
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been no negligence shown or proved to the eourt 
sufficient to 1uake a pri1ua faeie ea~e'' 
and upon the further ground 
··that the eYidence of the plaintiff it~elf shows con-
tributory negligence.'' 
Tliis n10tion i~ n10re ~Pl'eifir than that required by the 
rules and i~ certainly sufficient for the court to grant a 
non-suit. In any event, the plaintiff and appellant n1ade 
no offer of further testimony, nor did he ask in what 
particulars his case was wanting, nor did he ask for a 
new trial. It is clear this appeal is without merit. 
Plaintiff's evidence also ~hows affirmatively 
(1) That the truck in question made regular trips 
after defendant serviced it as follows: January 25th, to 
Idaho Falls, Idaho ; 26th, Rock Springs, Wyoming; 29th, 
Burley and Rupert, Idaho; 30th, Pocatello, Idaho; and 
31st, 'Vattis, Utah, Exhibit F, and February 1st Spring 
Canyon, Utah Exhibit G. T. Pg. 63. 
(2) The capacity of the trailers being pulled by it 
ranged from 4500 to 5700 gallons. T. Pg. 74 and 76. 
(3) Some of these hauls were over long and heavy 
grades. T. Pg. 76. 
( 4) And at speeds up to 50 miles per hour and on 
hills as low as 10 miles per hour. T. Pg. 77. 
All of which necessarily putting a terrific strain on 
the motor and the oil filter, for considerable of the whole 
2190 miles traveled by it after being serviced. During 
all that time the motor functioned smoothly and 
normally. T. Pg. 64 and 65. 
( 5) The oil used in servicing the motor by the de-
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fendant was plaintiff's own oil purchased b~· him from 
Phillips 66. T. Pg. 69 and 70, and 
( 6) Plaintiff's agent, Woolslayer, delivered the 
truck to defendant and watched it being serviced. T. 
Pg. 67. He testified it was his duty to renmin with and 
wateh it being serviced. T. Pg. 69. He saw nothing 
wrong with the manner in which it was ~erviced or he 
would ha \'e testified to that fact. lie admitted that he 
helped to service it. T. Pg. 69. 
Plaintiff's witness, Miller, who undertook to wrap 
the filter as he thought it must have been wrapped by 
defendant, said: 
'• Q. * * * * Now, were you or were you not very 
conscious of the fact that was sticking out of the end! 
A. I imagine I did. I rolled it on purpose, didn't 
I. * * * * 
Q. You were extremely conscious of the fact that 
the bag was over there~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if you had wound the bag like that, not 
knowing that you had so wound it and put it in there, 
you would im1nediately be called to the attention that 
the bag was sticking over the end or the point, wouldn't 
you~ 
A. That's right, yes." * * * * 
The charge here, it rnust be remembered, is a negli-
gent installation, not an intentional and deliberate wrong-
doing as this witness testified to. 
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He also testified that it wa~ an ··old uwtor,,, he 
didn't know .. ,vhen it wa~ worked on last,_ 'r. Pg. :~r>. 
That cold oiln1ay blow the filter bag out. '1\ Pg. 39. 
The bag can uwve under oil pressure. rl\ Pg. 40. 
Plaintiff'~ witness, Holt, in testifying how he 
thought the filter bag wa~ installed agreed with .Miller 
that such installation would have had to have been in-
tentional and deliberate. 
· • Q. K ow, you have wrapped the filter bag and the 
spacer unit in the n1anner in which you think it was 
wrapped when it was installed on January 2-l, 1951, at 
Slim Olson's ¥ 
~\. Yes, that's right. 
Q. Is that correct! 
A. That's the way I believe it was. 
Q. In wrapping that, you have deliberately pulled 
a portion of the bag out over the ear in the flange. Is 
that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you had to wrap and unwrap that five or 
six times and deliberately pull that out to get it wrapped 
that way, didn't you? 
A. I did that time. 
Q. That is the way you think this bag was installed~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if it were wrapped the way you have in-
dicated it was wrapped and for you to wrap it that ,,·ay. 
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it would have to be intentionally and consciously done 
that way. 
A. Yes. * * * *" T. Pg. 50. 
Again, 
Being asked about whether, when the engine was 
started up pumping the oil into the filter bag it would 
inflate the bag up evenly throughout and iron out any 
wrinkles, said -
" Q. Wouldn't it iron out all the wrinkles~ 
A. It's possible. 
Q. Blow them up like you blow air into a paper 
bag and fill in all the wrinkles and even it out, wouldn't 
it~ 
A. I presume it would, yes.'' * * •)(: * 
'' Q. The answer is 'yes'. 
A. Yes.'' T. Pg. 53." 
T. Pg. 52. 
He further testified that would happen the first 
time the motor was started up and every other time 
it was started during the full 2190 miles. T. Pg. 53. * * * 
He clearly showed a way other than that testified 
to by Miller and others in which the lines could be clogged 
- stopping the flow of oil to the engine and causing the 
dmnage complained of. 
Also, the witness, Holt, testified similarly upon being 
recalled as follows : 
"Q. So that if the discharge pipe to the cmn shaft 
became clogged with sludge or something else, there 
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would be no place for the oil to go except to build up 
such pressure that son1ething would break. 
A. S01uething would have to break. That pump 
has a capacity of about 15 gallons per minute. 
Q. -w .. herever the clogging occurred between the 
spool, exhibit D, and the ca1nshaft, it would have that 
smne result! 
A. You would build up back pressure. 
Q. Now, assu1ning, ~Ir. Holt,- that is hypothetical 
now. Assuming that the line to the camshaft becmne 
clogged and built up a terrific pressure in the cylinder, 
Exhibit C, and then was suddenly released, there would 
be a tendency for oil to rush under that extreme pressure 
Yery quickly and fast into the outlet from the spool in 
the cylinder, Yery quickly. Is that true~ 
A. I imagine that would be." 
That being the case then, under those circu1nstances, 
the filter bag, being properly installed, could be forced 
under that extreme pressure into the discharge line 
clogging it and resulting in the damage complained of. 
ARGUl\IENT ON CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
Specifically denying any sufficient evidence of neg-
ligence on the part of defendant, but for the sake of this 
argument in the event evidence of negligence upon any 
theory should be found, we think it pertinent here to in-
elude son1e of the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses on 
eross exan1ination with respect thereto. 
"Q. (Mr. Aadneson) Are you willing to stipulate 
as to what the 1nileage of the truck in question was front 
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the time of service until the time of plugging? 
Mr. Burton: Yes. We have that 2190 Iniles. rro 
save time; I think that's 2190 Iniles. I wrote that down." 
Cross-examination T. Pg. 31. 
~lr. Miller 
"Q. Your indulgence a minute, Mr. l\filler, how 
often should this oil filter bag be changed? 
A. I recommend every oil change. 
Q. Do you have a lubricating standard for Cum-
mings motors f 
A. Yes. 
Q. IIow often does it recmmnend an oil change~ 
A. We recommend - are you talking about the' 
Cuininings Company¥ 
Q. You. What do you recmnmend' 
A. The customer usually decides. We recommend 
anywhere from 1500 to 2500. 
Q. Oil change 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have a knowledge of what Cummings 
recommends 1 
THE COURT: They have that here. There's 
no need of asking that. 
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Q. \\"ill you 8tipulate what the recouuuendation is: 
.MR. Bl!HTO.N: Yes. If you have anything to 
clai1n for it. It's every 500 gallons. 
1\lR HUUGINS: What? 
A. Every 500 gallons of fuel oil. If you get 5 1niles 
a gallon you will get what'?" T. Pg. 33 and 34. 
Th01nas H. Mitchell Cross examination. 
"Q. Then how long did you run the 1notor, you say, 
before you threw the truck in gear and started 1noving 
the truck itself~ 
A. Oh, I ilnagine 2 or 3 minutes. 
Q. Didn't hear anything of an unusual nature then. 
A. No. 
Q. Then you threw it in gear and started nwving. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And where were you when you heard or saw 
or noticed anything of an unusual nature~ 
A. Well, I just got back on and just got going. 
Q. What did you hear finally that called your at-
tention to the fact that something was perhaps wrong~ 
. A. Well, I heard something like a bearing going out 
and temperature rising and oil pressure left, and the 
only thing you could do is stop." T. Pg. 90. 
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Theone Green testified direct 
'' Q. VVas there anything unusual in the operation 
of the truck during that distance t (five or six miles 
between Phillips and Standard). 
A. I never noticed anything until I approached the 
loading dock at Standard Oil. 
Q. All right. Then what did you notice~ 
A. Well, I detected a slight, what I called a knock-
ing noise, different to the norn1al sound of the engine. 
Q. And what did you do at the time? 
A. Well, I went ahead and pulled into the dock 
and loaded my truck and after I was loaded I pulled out 
from the dock so those behind me could load, and stopped 
the engine and pulled the dip stick on the engine to see 
if the oil supply was normal, see if I had a normal 
supply of oil, if it was up to level. 
* * * * :j[: 
Q. What is the next thing you did 1 
A. Then I started back to the highway frmn the 
refinery, down to the road to get on the highway and 
keeping a check on the oil gauge to see if smnething was 
wrong." T. Pg. 96. 
Q. All right. What did you see 1 
A. The oil stayed up to normal. 
THE COURT : Proceed clear to where you 
stopped. 
A. I proceeded south from the refinery approXI-
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mat ely a 1nile, I would ::;ay, where you turn left across 
the tracks at Beck'::; Hot Springs then onto highway 91, 
and I proceeded north about a m.ile and a half, I would 
say. and occasionally, one or two tilnes I detected knock-
ing, or thought I did, and when I got about a 1nile north, 
or a 1nile and a half north, to the ti1ne I stopped, the oil 
gauge fluctuated, started to fall off. I started losing 
power. I pulled the c01npression gauge on the engine 
and stopped it.'' 
Cross exanrination. T. Pg. 97. 
·' Q. Did the engine continue to knock until you 
stopped at the dock for your load at Standard 1 
.A.. No. Just a slight knock intermittently. It 
wasn't a steady knock. T. Pg. 125. 
Q. You didn't stop the 1notor to determine what 
was causing the knocking1 
A. I stopped it as I pulled up to the dock just a 
few feet after I heard it. 
Q. Did you call a mechanic at that time to come and 
inspect the car 1 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. You are not a mechanic. 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And of course you realized at that time you were 
not a mechanic? 
A. Right. 
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Q. Did you realize you were operating an expen-
sive piece of machinery¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Yet, not withstanding you heard this unusual 
knocking, you called no mechanic to see what the trouble 
was. 
A. I didn't call him then, no. 
* * * * * 
Q. In full knowledge you had some kind of motor 
trouble you pulled out with a load. 
A. I didn't think I had 1notor trouble. T. Pg. 106. 
* * * * * 
Q. 'Vhen did you first notice the knocking sound 
again¥ 
A. Well, the first heavy knocking I got was when 
I approached, started on highway 91. 
Q. Where was the first light knocking 1 
court intervene. * "" * * 
A. I noticed it as I was proceeding from Standard 
Oil, after and on, but not heavy until I got to highway 
91 and proceeded north. T. Pg. 107. 
Butte v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co. 14 Ut. 477 p. 77, 
78, it was held that 
''while the defendant may have been quilty of neg-
ligence that contributed to the injury complained of, 
it is clear that the plaintiff's negligence also con-
tributed to the same injury * * * * where there is no 
evidence of the existance of a fact essential to a 
reco{er, or when the evidence establishes a fact fatal 
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to a recovery with such certainty as to leave no 
reasonable doubt in the u1inds of fair 1nen, the court 
should grant a nonsuit, or, if the case is subrnitted to a 
jury, instruct a verdict for the defendant.'' 
CONCLUSION 
\Ye have printed in our brief several exerpts fron1 
plaintiff's \vitnesses showing conflicting statmnents, also 
developing, as far as the trial court would pennit, that 
there were other \Yays in which the damage could have 
resulted, in refutation of their direct testimony on direct 
examination that ''they knew of no other way the dan1age 
could have been caused.'' It necessarily follows then 
that, as left upon cross-exmnination, there was no testi-
mony of such a nature to convince the learned trial court 
that any negligence was shown. Consider this with the 
further testimony that plaintiff's own agent watched and 
helped the defendant service the engine and he saw noth-
ing wrong with the manner in which it was serviced, and 
also with the evidence of plaintiffs witness of the man-
ner in which they operated the truck 2190 miles after 
it was serviced, and under considerable strain and varied 
conditions even after indisputable and audible evidence on 
the night of February 2nd that something had gone 
wrong with the n1otor we must conclude then and we 
submit that: 
1. The court sitting without a jury, having heard 
all of the plaintiff's evidence correctly concluded that 
the plaintiff had not convincingly shown a right to relief 
- as the rule was construed in United States v. United 
States Gypsum Co. supra. 
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2. The evidence of plaintiff clearly show~ negli-
gence on his part in the operation of the truck, but 
~hows no negligence on the part of defendant. 
3. The motion for nonsuit was more fully stated 
that required under our rules of civil procedure as con-
strued by the Federal courts. 
4. Plaintiff's theory of the case and the cases cited 
by him are clearly not in point under Rules 1 (a) and 41 
(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
5. This Supreme Court in its most recent case of 
Liquor Control Commission v. Chris E. Athis and C. V. 
Lack, No. 7738 and Filed April10, 1952, has followed the 
construction placed by the Federal Courts on its Rules, 
in the construction of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
which are, to all intents and purposes, verbatum. 
6. The motion for nonsuit was properly granted. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
HUGGINS & HUGGINS 
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